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Abstract
Objective—To systematically review studies of tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies.
Data sources—We conducted searches between 1st October 2009 and 31st March 2010 on 14
databases/websites, in relevant bibliographies and via experts.
Study selection—We included studies if they: focused on industry efforts to influence tobacco
tax policies; drew on empirical evidence; were in English; concerned the period 1985–2010. 36
studies met these criteria.
Data extraction—Two reviewers undertook data extraction and critical appraisal. A random
selection of 15 studies (42%) was subject to second review.
Data synthesis—We assessed evidence thematically to identify distinct tobacco industry aims,
arguments and tactics. 34 studies examined industry efforts to influence tax levels. They suggest
industry works hard to prevent significant increases and particularly dislikes taxes ‘earmarked’ for
tobacco control. Key arguments to counter increases are that tobacco taxes are socially regressive,
unfair and lead to increased levels of illicit trade and negative economic impacts. For earmarked
taxes, the industry also frequently tries to raise concerns about revenue allocation. Assessing
industry arguments against established evidence demonstrates most are unsupported. Key industry
tactics include: establishing ‘front groups’; securing credible allies, direct lobbying; and publicity
campaigns. Only seven studies examined efforts to influence tax structures. They suggest
company preferences vary and tactics centre on direct lobbying.
Conclusions—The tobacco industry has historically tried to keep tobacco taxes low using
consistent tactics and misleading arguments. Further research is required to explore efforts to
influence: tax structures; excise policies beyond the US; recent policies.
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BACKGROUND
Much has been learnt about industry efforts to influence tobacco control policies,
particularly through research on internal corporate documents released via litigation in the
US.[1] Systematic reviews of particular policy areas within this literature can provide
succinct overviews,[2–4] enabling common industry tactics and arguments, as well as any
important gaps in the evidence-base, to be identified.[2,5] This systematic review examines
studies investigating tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax policies. These are of
central importance to tobacco companies, both because they are one of the most effective
policy levers for tobacco control,[6–8] and because tax levels and structures impact on
profits.[8]
Tobacco Taxes
Traditionally tobacco excise taxes have been implemented as a means of accruing
government revenue but they are increasingly also being used for tobacco control.[7–9] A
number of different types of tobacco excise tax exist – see Box 1.
Tobacco taxes can also be ‘earmarked’ (‘hypothecated’) for spending in particular areas
(e.g. some cigarette taxes in some US states are ring-fenced for spending on specific health
issues).
METHODS
We systematically sought to identify empirical (qualitative and quantitative) studies
concerning tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax policies. We included studies if
they: focused on tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies; drew on empirical
evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1985–2010 (significant changes
to the tobacco market since the mid-1980s decreased the relevance of earlier studies). 14
electronic databases/websites were searched between October 2009 and March 2010. These
covered academic research (published and unpublished), grey literature and some newspaper
articles. The main search string employed was: (tobacco OR cigar* OR snus OR ‘Philip
Morris’ OR JTI OR ‘R.J. Reynolds’ OR Gallaher) AND (taxation OR tax OR excise OR
price OR pricing) AND (polic* OR intervention OR lobb* OR influence), although this was
adapted for specific sites (full search strategy details are available in the Web Appendix). In
addition, the bibliographies of all included publications were hand searched and experts
were contacted to identify further studies.
In total, we located 2,678 publications, of which we excluded 2,424 on the basis of the title/
abstract. We retrieved 243 publications for full analysis but were unable to locate 11
publications (mostly newspaper or magazine articles). On the basis of the full analysis, we
excluded a further 197 publications, The remaining 46 publications met the inclusion
criteria. However, in several cases more than one publication was based on the same study
or policy initiative. These were assessed collectively to avoid ‘double-counting’. In this
article, we use the term ‘study’ to refer to all included publications relating to the same
policy initiative(s). The total number of studies included was 36.
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First reviewers extracted data from and critically appraised studies using critical appraisal
criteria for qualitative papers (Web Appendix)[10–12]. No quality score was calculated. We
undertook second reviewing for a random selection of 42% (15) of studies (see Web
Appendix). We deemed further second reviewing unnecessary as less than a dozen
differences were identified and all were minor.
Synthesis
Having summarised and critically appraised all papers (Web Appendix provides a tabulated
summary) we first categorised studies according to industry’s tax-related aims, then assessed
the arguments and tactics used to achieve these aims. Arguments and tactics were
summarised in the order of frequency with which they were identified in studies, then
assessed for veracity against recent, peer-reviewed evidence (notably the International
Agency for Research on Cancer’s (IARC) 2011 handbook on the effectiveness of tax and
price policies for tobacco control).[8]
RESULTS
Tobacco industry aims and study context
The studies identified two distinct industry tax-related aims: (i) to influence tobacco tax
levels;[13–56] and (ii) to shape tobacco tax structures.[14–17,23,57,58] Of the 34 studies
discussing industry efforts to influence tax levels (five of which also discussed tax
structures), only five concerned policies outside North America[13–17] (Table 1). 22 of
these studies focused on state/province level, 11 (all in the US) focused on initiatives that
could be introduced by popular vote,[22,24,25,29,30,36–39,41,42,44–46,49,53,56] six
focused on standard legislative developments,[23,26,32,50,51,54] and five focused on both
(or were unspecific).[19,31,33–35,43,47,52] 17 studies concerned policy proposals to
substantially increase taxes and ‘earmark’ the resulting revenue for tobacco control
programmes (all at US state level). Although it is consequently difficult to ascertain whether
the industry was concerned about tax increases per se or the funding of tobacco control
activities, we distinguish arguments and strategies used to address each issue. Only one
study focused on tobacco tax developments in an area with high levels of tobacco farming
(South Carolina, USA).[51]
Seven studies concerned industry efforts to shape excise structures,[14–17,23,57,58] and
these had a different geographic and economic profile, with only one North American study
(Hawai’i).[23] The rest focused on countries retaining or in the process of privatising state-
owned tobacco interests, where tobacco and economic policies were often in a state of flux.
[14–17,57,58]
The majority of studies focused on policy developments between the mid-1980s and
mid-1990s. Where more contemporary information was included, it was often limited.
[14,17,29,30,32–35,39,40,44,45,47–52,54]
Arguments and tactics relating to the different aims are explored below. Where they appear
to vary as a result of different geographical/political contexts, this is highlighted.
Studies examining industry efforts to influence tax levels
Assessing industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes low
All 34 studies focusing on industry efforts to influence tobacco tax levels state or imply that
the aim was to prevent increases or reduce current levels. Arguments to keep tobacco taxes
low are summarised in Table 2 and briefly assessed against available evidence.
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The industry argument to prevent tax increases (or secure reductions) most commonly
identified in studies was the claim that tax increases lead to illicit trade. In some cases, this
argument was expanded on with claims that increases would divert police attention away
from other (more violent) crimes.[56] It was deployed in the US at state level and at national
levels in Canada, Lebanon, South Africa and a variety of Former Soviet Union countries,
even in cases where smuggling was not a significant issue,[13] suggesting it is not context-
specific. In several cases, this argument enabled industry to attract the support of non-
traditional, credible allies such as the police.[26,53,56] Canada was sometimes used as an
example to strengthen this argument,[13] following a successful industry campaign to
reverse a tobacco tax increase there in the early 1990s, on the basis that this would reduce
the growing smuggling problem.[26,40] In reality, the industry was directly involved in
smuggling and the decision to reduce taxes only increased smoking rates in young people,
without significantly reducing smuggling.[26,40]
The second most frequently identified argument was that tobacco excises are regressive,
meaning higher tobacco taxes cost relatively more to poorer and more marginal groups. One
study found the industry went as far as arguing such increases would contribute to class
warfare, pitting upper middle class liberals (mostly white) against lower middle class,
working people (mostly minority ethnic groups).[41] This argument also enabled the
industry to secure anti-tax support from non-traditional allies, including labor groups (e.g.
unions), organisations representing minority ethnic groups and left-of-centre politicians.
[20,21,31,32,43,48]
As Table 2 illustrates, all of the other arguments identified in studies as being employed by
industry to keep tobacco taxes low are unsupported by available evidence.
Assessing industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes to prevent earmarking
17 studies, all focusing on the US, concerned proposals for tax increases in which revenue
would be earmarked for health programmes.[20–22,24,25,28–30,36–39,41,42,44–47,50–
54,56]. Arguments used by the industry to prevent earmarking are summarised in Table 3
and assessed against the available evidence.
The vast majority of initiatives involved a direct public ballot/vote (feasible in 27 US
states[67]), so it is difficult to assess their generalizability. Nevertheless, some important
observations can be made by comparing the studies in this review. For example, the most
commonly identified industry argument in the studies was that earmarked funds would be
used in ways which the public did not support and/or which differed from those described in
the original proposal. Specifically, the industry often argued that tobacco taxes would be
misused to subsidise healthcare for poorer groups, which the industry sometimes framed as a
diversion of funds to ‘greedy’ doctors, hospitals, healthcare companies, insurers and/or
voluntary health groups.[22,29–31,36,37,42,44,51,53] Such efforts were helped by the fact
that healthcare and health insurance organisations often wanted to divert the funds and by
the fact the tobacco industry sometimes worked with them to try to achieve such diversions.
[22,24,53] This not only limited resources for tobacco control (where funds had originally
been earmarked for) but also provided evidence to support this argument.
Several other industry arguments against taxation identified in the studies are value (rather
than evidence) based, such as the claim that tobacco taxes are unfair on smokers.
Nevertheless, as Table 3 illustrates, these claims fail to acknowledge that smoking is an
addiction typically established in childhood,[68] and that most smokers would rather quit.
[64,65]
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Other arguments were context-specific but it is notable that some of these (such as the claim
that particular proposals were illegal) were found to have been untrue in the contexts in
which they were used.[36,37,38,41,56] The effectiveness of, and industry emphasis on,
different arguments may vary with context (particularly in light of industry’s investment in
market-research – see below). For example, arguments concerning unfairness and ‘state
interference’ were more commonly identified in studies concerning Republican/swing states
(i.e. states in which such arguments might be expected to be more persuasive).[39,42,52,54]
Industry tactics to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking
The tactics/mechanisms identified in the studies that the tobacco industry employed to
counter tobacco excise increases are summarised in Table 4.
Most of the tactics outlined in Table 4 mirror broader tobacco industry tactics for
influencing policy.[70,71] Of the fifteen tactics identified in more than one study, four (1,2,6
and 13 in Table 4) represent ways of obscuring tobacco industry involvement in tobacco tax
debates. The tobacco industry’s use of front groups has already been well researched,[72,73]
and this review demonstrates the vast number of front groups it has been able to establish/
use in tax debates, plus the apparently local, ‘grassroots’ identities of many such groups (see
names in Box 2).
Studies included examples of industry using front groups both to promote industry
arguments about tobacco tax,[22,25,33–35,37,38,41,43,46,48,53] and to recruit credible
allies to anti-tobacco tax campaigns.[21,27,28,43,53] By approaching organizations via the
Labor Management Committee (a group established by the Tobacco Institute, a trade
association of American tobacco companies, and the Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco
Workers Union)[43] and/or an industry created front group known as the Consumer Tax
Alliance,[20,21,27,28,32,43,48,55] and by making claims about the regressive nature of
tobacco taxes (see above), the tobacco industry was able to successfully persuade some key
labor unions and minority groups to support and promote anti-tobacco tax arguments. In the
US, this included the Coalition of Labor Union Women.[20,21] Women Involved in Farm
Economics,[35] the Congressional Black Caucus[55] and the National Black Police
Association.[55] Similarly, arguments about illicit trade (Table 2) helped the industry recruit
support from retailers[26,42,46] and police groups.[26,53,56]
The industry’s combined use of front groups and credible allies helped conceal the origin of
industry tax-related arguments and campaigns. This is important given that public
knowledge of tobacco industry involvement has been shown to increase public support for
tobacco control measures.[72] Tobacco friendly experts, consultancy, public relations and
advertising firms were all similarly employed to obscure industry involvement.[14,16–
19,23–25,33,34,37,41,48,50,52–54]
Other tactics, such as mass media and publicity campaigns (including op-ed pieces, letters to
newspapers and paid adverts), worked to drum up support for industry positions.[29,30,44]
In many cases, these campaigns were informed by industry commissioned studies, which
either provided local market research to inform the choice of arguments or which sought to
provide support for pre-chosen arguments.[14,19,21,23,26,42,44–46,48,52,55,56] One US
review found the industry was increasing its use of market research to inform its anti-tax
campaigns, successfully using this information to determine which proposals were deemed
worth fighting and which arguments to prioritise.[45]
The industry’s campaigns often drew on the relationships it had developed with credible
allies. For example, a study of efforts to introduce earmarked tobacco taxes in California
found the most effective advert featured an allegedly real, undercover police officer
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discussing the crime implications of the proposed tobacco tax increases (the effectiveness of
this advert was subsequently undermined when it was revealed that the officer only had a
police desk job and was also a part-time actor).[53] In other examples (where tax increases
were being pursued through the legislature, rather than by direct public votes), the industry
helped co-ordinate postal and/or telephone-based campaigns which aimed to encourage/
facilitate public lobbying of officials, sometimes by connecting them directly through to
officials’ offices.[19,31,42,49,50,52] Two studies found tobacco companies encouraged
their own staff and stakeholders to lobby policymakers.[18,19] All this suggests public
health advocates and those targeted with anti-tobacco tax messages, such as journalists and
policymakers, ought to be alert to the tobacco industry’s potential involvement, even where
messages appear to have emerged from grassroots or independent sources.
The review indicates that the industry also commonly uses a range of more traditional tactics
for influencing policy in efforts to prevent tax increases, including direct lobbying of key
policymakers and paying or giving gifts to policymakers.[13–17,21–24,25,29,30,32–
34,43,47,49–51,53,55] One study in Missouri, US (a swing state) reported that left-of-centre
and minority politicians were a particular focus,[29,30] whilst most studies mentioning gift-
giving/payments suggested the most influential officials were targeted.[29,30,38,39] Only
one study attempted to measure the impact of political donations from the tobacco industry
in any detail and it found they had a statistically detectable effect on the legislative behavior
of US senators on tobacco control issues.[24] This suggests that it will be critical to ensure
that Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which seeks to protect
public health policies from industry interference,[74] is ratified and applied to tobacco tax
policies. However, as one study found payments to policymakers were often made via third
parties to disguise industry links,[22] this may be difficult to enforce without broader
transparency requirements.
Other tactics used by the tobacco industry to prevent proposals for tobacco tax increases that
were mentioned in more than one study included working collaboratively, mounting legal/
official challenges and proposing alternative legislation. All of these tactics have been
reported in relation to broader tobacco industry efforts to combat tobacco control policies.
[70,71] Most of the legal challenges reported in studies failed,[36–38,41] which seems to
have been partially because tobacco control advocates learnt from earlier challenges by the
industry and worked pre-emptively to prevent the success of any future challenges (e.g. by
collecting many more signatures than officially required when seeking to demonstrate public
support for tobacco tax increases, thereby preventing successful industry challenges around
signature veracity).[37,38,41]
Other tactics were specific to tobacco taxation, many of which appear to have been
relatively successful. For example, five of the six studies reporting industry efforts to
confuse debates about tobacco excise increases with broader debates about tax increases (all
in the US, three of which focused on state level ballot action and three on federal activities)
found the industry was successful in achieving at least some of its tax-related aims.
[21,29,30,45,46,48] Furthermore, the industry’s own research indicated that this was a
particularly effective approach.[45] This suggests public health advocates need to work hard
to prevent public confusion about distinct tax policies.
The industry also appears to have been consistently effective in its efforts to divert funds
away from tobacco control measures to other causes,[22,24,25,37,38,39,41,53,56] and to
promote smuggling in response to tobacco tax increases (although only two studies
mentioned the latter).[19,40] These two tactics are particularly important because they each
provide evidence to support popular industry arguments against tobacco tax increases (see
Table 2). This suggests tobacco control advocates need to work with policymakers from an
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early stage in the development of tobacco tax proposals in order to ensure that an adequate
combination of measures to combat illicit trade are in place,[8] and that any proposals for
earmarking are sufficiently detailed.
The success of tobacco industry efforts to keep tobacco taxes low and
prevent earmarking
The majority of studies examined state-level initiatives for tax increases in the US (many of
which were earmarked) and most found that the industry experienced mixed success,
preventing some proposals and amending others in beneficial ways for the industry.
[22,23,27,31,32,50,53,54,56] Contextual factors which appeared to assist the passage of
earmarked tax increases in US states included opportunities to use direct public votes, the
presence of coherent, adequately funded pro-tobacco tax campaigns (in many studies,
campaigns were partially funded by voluntary health groups, such as the American Cancer
Society, and healthcare organisations), and the presence of budgetary deficits.
[24,25,37,38,41,43,56] In contrast, existing public concern about general tax increases and/
or distrust of politicians and/or medics and healthcare firms (where proposals were for
earmarked tobacco taxes to contribute to healthcare costs) appeared to aid industry
campaigns. Overall, the studies suggest the industry has been more successful at diverting
‘earmarked’ funds away from tobacco control activities during implementation than in
completely preventing excise increases.[22,24,38,41,45,53] This may reinforce future
industry claims that earmarked taxes will be used for purposes other than those described in
proposals (see Table 3).
One of the few comparative studies in this review found the amount of resources invested by
the tobacco industry into anti-tax campaigns was a poor indicator of success,[45] whilst the
use of market research to guide industry activities was a good indicator.[45]
Most studies focusing on industry efforts to keep tobacco taxes low at a national level found
the industry was successful.[13,15,16–18,26,27,28,40] In all cases, a key argument was that
tax increases would fuel (or were already fuelling) illicit trade. However, the illicit trade
argument was also used in the only study reporting industry failure at the national level, in
Hungary.[14] In this example, Philip Morris was advised by officials that its efforts to
prevent an excise increase had failed because of the ‘divided position of the industry,’[14] a
factor which other studies reveal little about as they tend to refer generically to ‘the tobacco
industry’, without distinguishing company positions or activities.
Studies concerned with tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco
excise structures
Only seven studies considered industry efforts to influence tobacco excise structures, most
of which found different companies favoured different structures in different contexts. Philip
Morris (which produces the high-end Marlboro cigarettes) was consistently found to
promote specific taxes,[14,16,17,23] whereas British American Tobacco (BAT; which has
historically had a more diverse brand portfolio including mid-price and cheaper, local
brands) appeared to prefer mixed excise structures, incorporating an ad valorem element,
[14,15,17] presumably because of the competitive advantage this confers over Philip Morris
(see Box 1).[15,17] Despite their varying preferences, tobacco companies were consistently
found to promote their preferred tax structures by claiming that it would increase
government revenue and reduce illicit trade,[15,17,23,57] even when they were aware this
was not necessarily true.[15,57]
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BAT and Philip Morris also appear to have differed in their position on import duties in
Hungary, with Philip Morris lobbying to reduce import duties, whilst believing that BAT
was working to retain them.[14] There is some evidence to suggest that tobacco company
positions on import duties vary according to the level of market dominance, meaning that
the same company may take different positions on this in different contexts. For example, a
study of tobacco industry influence in Uzbekistan found that BAT sought to introduce
protective import taxes once it had achieved market dominance,[15] whilst a study in
Lebanon found evidence of BAT working to prevent increased import duties.[17] However,
the limited number of studies exploring these issues means further research is required to
draw firm conclusions.
Perhaps unsurprisingly for such a technical issue, the main tactic identified for influencing
tax structures was direct lobbying of officials,[16,17,23] sometimes organised via third party
consultants.[15,57] Companies also sought support for their preferred excise structures from
international financial sources, such as the IMF[17] and US Trade Representatives.[16] In
Hawaii, Philip Morris and the Tobacco Institute employed economists to help promote a
specific structure.[23] In former Soviet Union countries, BAT‘s efforts to influence tax
structures appear to have been aided by the fact it was able to position itself as a credible
source of tax expertise (officials in these counties were, at that time, unused to dealing with
free-market corporations and had little experience with tobacco excise).[15,57] In Hawaii
and the Gulf Region, the tobacco industry exploited differences in tax structures between
neighbouring regions/countries.[18,23] In contrast to the studies concerned with excise
levels, none of the studies of tax structures mentioned any significant public health
involvement. Combined with the lack of research on this issue, this suggests public health
advocates urgently need to enhance their understanding of tobacco tax structures and engage
in policy debates on this issue.
REVIEW LIMITATIONS
To ensure that the searches were as extensive as possible, our strategies were piloted,
revised and aided by a qualified librarian (see acknowledgements). In addition, the
bibliographies of all pertinent studies were hand-searched, we consulted experts in the area
and requested information on unpublished or in-progress research. Despite this, it is not
possible to be certain that all relevant studies have been located. The review is also limited
by the fact that most included studies did not primarily focus on tobacco industry efforts to
influence tobacco tax policies and merely considered this as part of a broader study. Finally,
there was a strong geographical bias: studies involving the US dominate evidence relating to
industry efforts to influence excise levels (which may have been exacerbated by the fact we
only included publications in English), whilst countries undergoing political and economic
transitions dominate evidence concerning industry efforts to influence tax structures. In both
cases, this limits the extent to which we can make claims about the generalizability of
positions, arguments and tactics.
CONCLUSION
The results of this review suggest that the tobacco industry tends, uniformly, to lobby
against tobacco excise increases (although it should be noted that the studies included in this
review largely focused on significant tobacco tax increases) and that it particularly dislikes
increases earmarked for tobacco control (which were largely pursued in US states, often by
direct public ballots). In challenging such proposals, the industry arguments identified most
often in the studies in this review, and used most successfully, were based on claims tobacco
tax increases are socially regressive and stimulate illicit tobacco trade (therefore contributing
to broader crime problems). As Table 2 summarises, these arguments are countered by a
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recent IARC review of available evidence.[8] Given that US studies showed that both
arguments helped the industry gain credible, non-traditional allies, including labor and
minority groups and left-of-centre politicians, it seems particularly important for public
health advocates to contest these two arguments.
Other commonly identified industry arguments which are particularly misleading include
claiming that tobacco taxes are unfair on smokers, with smoking being framed as a matter of
individual (adult) choice. This fails to acknowledge that smoking is an addiction typically
established in childhood,[68] and that most smokers would rather quit.[64,65] Also, where
the industry tries to cast doubt over the link between price and consumption, it is easy to
demonstrate that there is a great deal of evidence to support this link,[8] and that the industry
has been fully aware of this relationship for many years.[66] Similarly, there is a great deal
of evidence to challenge tobacco industry claims that increased tobacco taxes lead to lower
government revenues (indeed, the opposite is usually true).[8] Cross-study comparisons
highlight further evidence of the misleading nature of some of industry’s arguments. For
example, while the industry sometimes claims price increases will not reduce consumption,
[26,28] at other times it claims that tax increases will result in job losses because such rises
do reduce consumption.[13]
Certain arguments may be context specific but our ability to comment on this is limited by
the geographical bias of studies towards the US. Nevertheless, our review suggests the
industry adapts its arguments in line with perceived public and political preferences and
often undertakes market research in order to inform decisions about which arguments/claims
to concentrate on.[14,19,21,23,26,42,44–46,48,52,55,56]
The impact of arguments may also depend on context. For example, claims that tobacco tax
increases will lead to cross-border shopping, or illicit trade, may be more effective in
contexts in which substantial numbers of the population live close to an area in which
significantly cheaper tobacco products are available, or in which smuggling is already a
problem.
Industry arguments that the revenue from earmarked tobacco tax increases would be
diverted or misused seems likely to have been particularly persuasive to the public and/or
policymakers as such diversions did occur, in part as a result of tobacco industry efforts,
allowing the industry to gather evidence to support this claim. This suggests that advocates
for earmarked tobacco tax proposals need to ensure that revenue allocation is clearly agreed
at an early stage (preferably without tobacco industry involvement) and that this is closely
monitored in order to prevent later changes.[25]
Favoured industry tactics to influence policy decisions about tobacco excise largely mirror
those used by the industry to influence policy more generally,[70,71–73,75–80] including:
establishing ‘front groups’, allying with third parties that have (or can be persuaded to have)
a shared interest in the industry’s position; direct lobbying of relevant officials; media and
publicity campaigns; legal (or other official) challenges; commissioning/using supportive
research; employing professional consultants and public relations services; paying or giving
gifts to policy-makers; proposing alternative legislation; and using friendly ‘experts’.
However, three of the most successful tactics were tax-policy specific: confusing debates
about tobacco excise increases with broader tax debates; stimulating smuggling in order to
support claims that tax increases have contributed to more illicit trade; and working to divert
earmarked funds (see above).
The limited evidence concerning industry efforts to influence tobacco excise structures
(seven papers in seven different countries/regions), suggests different companies favour
different tax structures (e.g. Philip Morris seems to prefer specific structures, which favour
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the more expensive profile of its brands, and BAT seems to prefer mixed excise structures,
incorporating ad valorem elements, which favours its more mixed brand portfolio – see Box
1). Yet both present their preferred structure as the best means of reducing illicit trade and
increasing government revenue, even when aware this is not necessarily true.[15,57] There
is also some limited evidence that companies shift their position on import duties in relation
to their market dominance. This highlights the need to be aware of company and context
specific differences. Indeed, for tax policy, it may be unhelpful to refer generically to the
‘tobacco industry’.
The lack of studies focusing on industry efforts to influence tax structures also signals the
need for further research, not least because certain structures can work to limit the
availability of cheap tobacco products,[8] and because most of the existing research in this
area focuses on countries undergoing economic and political transformation.
[14,15,17,57,58] We currently know very little about tobacco company efforts to influence
tax structures in stable economies.
The significant geographical bias of included studies towards the US is important as the US
is one of the world’s most economically developed countries and tobacco excise levels are
lower there than in many other high income countries.[81] It should therefore not be
assumed that the industry will take the same positions or approaches elsewhere. Indeed,
even within the US, it is clear that approaches vary with context (e.g. between states
allowing public ballot initiatives and states in which the legislature is the only route to
achieving tobacco tax increases). Further research in the US could usefully identify the
extent to which tobacco industry arguments and tactics for influencing tax policies vary with
the political profile of states, over time and with other factors, such as the level of tobacco
farming. Beyond the US, reviews of non-English evidence and/or further research on all
aspects of tax-related lobbying is urgently required as the evidence we were able to locate
relating to the rest of the world was extremely limited. Increasing the evidence-base on
tobacco industry efforts to influence tax policies will enable us to better understand what
different parts of the industry aim to achieve in relation to tobacco excise rates and
structures in a variety of contexts, and why. This, in turn, should aid public health efforts to
achieve tobacco taxation policies that most effectively support tobacco control.
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Box 1: Common Taxes on Tobacco Products
Ad valorem tobacco excise: a tax based on a percentage of the retail price. This type of
tax tends to widen price differences between cigarette brands, making expensive brands
relatively more expensive. From a policy perspective, ad valorem taxes are attractive
because they automatically increase with industry price increases and are implicitly
linked to inflation. However, ad valorem excise allows industry to control tax levels by
keeping prices low (e.g. companies could lower their prices in response to a tax increase,
reducing the impact of the tax increase and thereby lowering the associated public health
benefit).
Specific tobacco excise: a fixed tax per cigarette. This type of tax works by adding a
fixed, monetary tax to every cigarette, regardless of its baseline price. It reduces price
differences between brands, benefitting manufacturers of more expensive cigarettes. For
this reason, and because specific taxes tend to increase consumer prices relatively more
than ad valorem excises, leading to higher reductions in consumption, it is generally
favored for tobacco control purposes.[8] Specific excises also provide more predictable
revenue for governments. From an industry perspective, this type of structure allows
companies to raise the base price of products (and therefore boost profit) without
increasing the tax and, because they are not automatically linked to inflation, specific
taxes may decline over time in real terms (unless a link to inflation is built in or
policymakers regularly increase tobacco taxes).
Import duties: taxes paid on imported goods to a country/region. Duties may be applied
to raw tobacco and/or tobacco products and may be calculated on a specific or ad
valorem basis.
Value Added Tax (VAT) / Sales Taxes: tobacco products may also be subject to more
general consumer taxes, such as VAT (usually calculated on an ad valorem basis).
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Box 2: Front groups identified in the studies
• Arizona Tax Research Association[39]
• Tobacco Institute’s Labor Management Committee (made up of union groups
associated with the tobacco industry)[20,21,28,43,48]
• Californians for Smoker’s Rights[22,56]
• Enough is Enough[25]
• No More Taxes[25]
• Citizens for a Sound Economy[31]
• Citizens Against Tax Abuse and Government Waste[42]
• Committee Against Unfair Taxes [38,41]
• Colorado Executive Committee[42]
• Consumer Tax Alliance[27]
• National Smokers’ Alliance[33–35]
• The National Coalition Against Crime and Tobacco Contraband[19]
• Missourians Against Tax Abuse[29,30]
• Missouri Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Stores Association[29,30]
• New England Convenience Store Association[50]
• Oklahoma Smokers’ Rights[49]
• Oregonians Against the Blank Check[44]
• The Fairness Matters to Oregonians Committee[37]
• Mainers Against Prohibiting Smoking[50]
• Citizens Against More Tax and Bureaucracy[46]
• Californians Against Unfair Tax Increases[53,56]
• South Carolina Association of Taxpayers[51]
• Stop the Measure 50 Tax Hike[44]
• Tobacco Consumers, Distributors & Producers Opposed to Unfair Tobacco
Sales Taxes[52]
• The Tax Foundation of Hawai’i[23]
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Box 3: What is already known about this topic?
• Many case studies of tobacco industry efforts to influence specific tobacco tax
policies exist but there has been no attempt to collate or collectively assess this
information.
What this paper adds
• This paper systematically reviews tobacco industry efforts to influence tax
policies.
• The review demonstrates that tobacco companies tend uniformly (often
collectively) to lobby against tobacco tax increases and that the four most
commonly identified arguments in the existing literature are that tax increases:
stimulate illicit trade; are socially regressive; are unfair on smokers; and have
negative economic impacts. Tactics to influence tax levels generally mirror
broader tobacco industry efforts to influence policies but also include some tax-
specific tactics, such as trying to confuse debates about tobacco tax increases
with broader tax policy debates.
• Comparing the industry arguments to keep taxes low identified in this review
across studies and against up-to-date expert evidence, the paper identifies the
misleading nature of many of these arguments.
• The review also highlights the paucity of research on tobacco industry efforts to
influence: (i) tobacco tax structures; and (ii) tobacco tax policies outside the US.
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Table 1
Geographical location and topic of studies
Geographical Location Number of studies Reported Industry Aim(s)
Influence tax
levels
Influence tax
levels and
structures
Influence tax
structures
African countries 1 (national: South Africa)[13] 1[13] 0 0
European countries 1 (national: Hungary)[14] 0 1[14] 0
Former Soviet Union countries 3 (2 national: Moldova; & Uzbekistan; one regional)
[15,57,58]
0 1[15] 2[57,58]
Middle Eastern countries 2 (one national; Lebanon; one regional)[16,17] 0 2[16,17] 0
North American countries 29 (7 national: 6 US; 1 Canada; 21 state level in US,
1 province level in Canada)[18–56]
28[18–22,24–56] 1[23] 0
Total 36 29 5 2
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Table 2
Industry arguments to influence tax levels
Industry arguments to keep tobacco taxes low Assessing industry arguments against available
evidence
(1) Higher taxes will lead to illicit trade (especially
smuggling) and, relatedly, organised crime.[13–
15,17,18,22,23,26,31,38–41,49,51–54,56]
Comparative assessments show the countries with the highest rates of smuggling are
not those with the highest levels of tobacco taxes.[8,59] In addition, two studies in
this review found the industry was directly involved in smuggling when using this
argument.[26,40] A decision to reduce taxes in Canada in response to this argument
increased smoking rates in young people without significantly reducing smuggling.
[26,40]
(2) Tobacco tax is regressive so higher taxes are
unfair on poorer & more marginal groups in society.
[20,21,27,28,31,32,38,39,41,43,44,48,50–54,56]
Although tobacco taxes do represent a higher percentage of the income of poorer
consumers (both because poorer groups tend to consume more tobacco products and
because tobacco taxes represent a significantly higher proportion of their incomes),
[60–62] tobacco tax increases can also be viewed as progressive because poorer
smokers are more price sensitive.[61–63] IARC found strong evidence that tobacco
use among lower-income populations is more responsive to tax and price increases
than tobacco use among higher-income groups (in high-income countries).[8]
(3) Tobacco taxes are unfair on, and punitive towards,
smokers. [13,23,27,29,30,36,37,41,42,45,51,52]
Whilst some may agree that high tobacco taxes are unfair on smokers, it is also true
that most smokers want to quit,[64,65] and that higher prices induce smokers to quit.
[8]
(4) Tax increases will have negative economic
impacts on local business and employment levels as
they will lead to greater cross-border trade and/or
purchases from shops with tax breaks on tobacco
products (e.g. shops on Native American Reserves).
[26,31,32,38,39,41,49,50,54]
Although tax increases can lead to some tax avoidance (e.g. through cross-border
trade), IARC found such behaviour failed to eliminate the larger public health
benefits and was not associated with significant negative economic impacts, such as
unemployment.[8]
(5)Tax increases will lead to declines in government
revenue (or less revenue than predicted).
[13,19,26,31,49,54]
IARC found tobacco tax increases lead to more, not less, government revenue.[8]
(6) Tax increases, by increasing illicit and cross-
border trade, will make it easier for young people to
access tobacco products.[49,50,52]
In addition to the fact that broader evidence indicates there is no clear association
between higher taxes and illicit trade (see above), IARC found tax increases are
particularly effective at reducing consumption amongst young people, who tend to be
more price sensitive.[8]
(7) Denial of link between increased tobacco prices
(as a result of increased taxes) and reduced
consumption.[26,28]
A great deal of evidence supports this link as summarised in the recent IARC review.
[8] Evidence also indicates that the industry has been aware of this relationship for
many years.[66] Indeed, one study in this review found evidence of the industry
arguing that tax increases would result in job losses precisely because such rises
would reduce consumption.[13]
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Table 3
Industry arguments to prevent earmarking
Industry arguments Assessing industry arguments against
available evidence
(1) The earmarked funds will be used in ways which the public do
not support and/or which differ from those described in the original
proposal(s). [22,24,25,29–31,36–39,41,42,44–46,51,53,56]
This argument was supported by the experience of some case studies.
In some cases, the tobacco industry was found to have worked
collaboratively with healthcare and health insurance organizations in
order to achieve these diversions.[22,24,53]
(2) Framing the use of ‘earmarked’ funds to pay for healthcare costs
as a tax on smokers to pay for services for others, which the industry
argued was unfair.[37,39,42,52,54]
This is a value-based claim which would only be valid if it reflected
public opinion in the specific context in which tax increases were being
proposed (i.e. it is not generalisable). It also fails to acknowledge most
smokers want to quit.[64,65]
(3) Claiming constitutional barriers prevent the introduction of
earmarked tobacco taxes.[29,30,38,44,52]
This claim is context-specific but it is worth noting that many of the
studies which noted industry efforts to legally (or otherwise officially)
challenge tax proposals found such challenges were unsuccessful.
[36,37,38,41,56]
(4) Claiming tobacco tax revenues are not a reliable source of
revenue and that it is therefore fiscally irresponsible to fund social
programmes via earmarked tobacco taxes.[39,44,50]
IARC concludes tobacco tax increases usually lead to increased
government revenue,[8] suggesting such claims are misleading.
(5) Claiming earmarked taxes are examples of excessive state
interference in people’s personal lives/freedoms and/or are examples
of the state exercising unwarranted power.[42,52].
This is a value-based claim which would only be valid if it reflected
public opinion in the specific context in which tax increases were being
proposed (i.e. it is not generalisable).
(6) Claiming earmarked taxes will lead to unnecessary, or unwieldy,
state bureaucracies. [52,56]
We could find no evidence to support this claim.
(7) Claiming a dependency on earmarked taxes will result in
spending cuts for specific programmes or gaps in funding for
popular programmes.[37,51]
This claim is context specific but we could find no evidence to support
it where it was used and, as IARC concludes tobacco tax increases
usually lead to increased government revenue,[8] such claims appear to
be misleading.
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Table 4
Industry tactics to keep tobacco taxes low and prevent earmarking
(1) Use of front groups: To obscure its own interests and thereby increase the credibility of the arguments used, 19 studies reveal that the
industry frequently established and/or funded ‘front groups’ (see Box 2).[19,21–23,25,27,29,31,33–35,37–39,41–44,46,48–50,53,54,56]
(2) Working with credible allies: 19 studies report that the industry allied itself with pre-existing, credible public interest groups to increase the
credibility of anti-tax arguments. [19,21,22,24,26–33,35,39,42,43,45,46,48–50,53–56]
(3) Traditional (direct) lobbying: 17 studies (of which 12 were in the US, with the others focusing on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries,
Hungary, Lebanon, South Africa and Uzbekistan) report evidence of traditional lobbying techniques, with industry targeting key decision-
makers both directly and indirectly (e.g. via consultants, campaign groups, business organisations, etc).[13–17,21–24,25,29,30,32–34,43,47,49–
51,53,56]
(4) Media (including op-ed pieces and letters to newspapers) and other publicity campaigns to encourage public opposition to proposed taxes:
16 studies found the tobacco industry used media/publicity campaigns to raise public awareness about tax proposals and create/increase public
support for the industry’s position.[19,26–31,34,37,38,41,42,44,48–50,52,53]
(5) Commissioning supportive/informative research, including market research of public opinion designed to inform industry campaigns: 13
studies reported evidence of the industry commissioning studies to support/inform its arguments about tobacco taxes. [14,19,21,23,26,42,44–
46,48,52,55,56]
(6) Employing consultants, public relations and/or advertising staff/firms: 12 studies demonstrate that, to gain advice and assistance with tax
lobbying and publicity campaigns, the industry employed consultancy, public relations, lobbying and/or advertising firms/staff.
[14,16,17,19,24,25,33,34,41,48,50,52–54]
(7) Paying or giving gifts to policy-makers: To help attract political support for industry positions on taxation, eight studies found evidence of
the industry paying or giving gifts to officials, political parties or campaigns.[22,24,31–33,42,44,51,55,56]
(8) Mounting legal/official challenges: seven studies (all in the US) reported industry efforts to mount legal or other official challenges to
combat excise legislation.[25,34,37,38,41,42,45,53,56]
(9) Confusing debates about tobacco tax increases with broader tax debates: six studies reported industry efforts to frame debates about tobacco
excise increases within broader debates about general tax increases, or to confuse proposals for tobacco tax increases with other unpopular tax
increases.[22,29,30,45,46,48,52]
(10) Working collaboratively: six studies found tobacco companies worked collaboratively to counter proposals for tobacco tax increases, often
via the Tobacco Institute.[19,32,42,49,50,56] Many other studies implicitly suggested tobacco company collaboration by referring generically
to the ‘tobacco industry’.
(11) Working to divert earmarked funds: Where earmarked tobacco excise increases were being pursued, five studies found the tobacco
industry worked to divert funds away from tobacco control measures to other causes (see discussion above).[22,24,25,37,38,39,41,53,56]
(12) Proposing alternative legislation: five studies identified industry efforts to promote weaker or irrelevant proposals/ballots to distract
attention away from the original proposal.[29,30,37,38,40,53,56] This included contributing money to a different ballot campaign ‘to disrupt
the signature-gathering process’ in Oregon,[37] using an industry funded group to circulate a competing petition, reducing the pool of available
paid signature-gatherers (by paying more for a different campaign) and confusing voters about the official proposal in California,[53] and
supporting proposals for smaller/more gradual tax increases or for increases which would earmark less revenue for tobacco control programmes
in Missouri and Massachusetts.[29,30,38,41]
(13) Using friendly, ‘independent’ experts: four studies found that the industry was using friendly ‘experts’ to present its arguments and aid
their credibility.[23,18,37,53] Examples included a high profile dentist,[37] an allegedly undercover police officer,[53] and Wall Street analysts
who were briefed by the tobacco industry before presenting their opinions to officials but who did not disclose this.[18,37,53]
(14) Stimulating smuggling in the event of tax increases: Two studies (one in Canada and one in the US) reported that the industry had been
involved in facilitating smuggling following tax increases.[19,40] The most detailed study indicates the industry helped promote smuggling
during a period in which tax increases were in place in Canada because it enabled them to maintain or increase profit margins as well as
providing support for their claim that the tax increases lead to increased illicit trade (see above).[40]
(15) Using tobacco industry employees/staff: Two studies found tobacco companies encouraged staff and/or shareholders to individually
lobbying their political representatives against tobacco tax increases.[18,19]
(16) Trying to undermine tobacco control experts: One study reported that the industry had attempted to undermine the credibility of a key
tobacco control academic by alleging without proof that he had misused grant funds for illegal political purposes and lobbying.[34]
(17) Encouraging groups supportive of higher taxes to push for alternative taxes: One study reported that the industry was so keen to avoid
tobacco taxes that it encouraged groups perceived to be supportive of higher taxation to push for a higher tax on corporations rather than
tobacco taxes,[20,21] even though tobacco companies frequently also lobby for lower corporate taxes.[69]
(18) Promoting the need for ‘sunset’ clauses: One study reported that the industry successfully promoted the need for a ‘sunset’ clause to be
included in legislation for a tobacco tax increase, effectively making it easier to challenge/repeal in future.[32]
(19) Trying to shift the policy/public focus: One study reported that the industry tried to divert attention away from tobacco tax proposals,
claiming that issues such as ‘salary levels of state employees, the quality of the universities and public school system, and the environment’
were more pressing than tobacco tax.[52]
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(20) Limiting the possibility of tax increases by increasing prices: One study suggested that the tobacco industry disguised retail price increases
behind well-publicised tobacco tax increases and then used these increases to restrict the government’s ability to further increase tobacco taxes.
[13]
(21) Calling for an end to public service announcements about the health impacts of tobacco: One study reported that the industry tried to
persuade the Governor of Montana to stop all public service announcements about tobacco during a period of debates about a proposal for a
tobacco tax increase, in order to ensure that these messages were not interpreted as support by the Governor for the tax increase.[52]
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